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A precise security analysis of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is an important
step for improving their performance. Here we consider a class of quantum soft filtering operations,
which generalizes the unambiguous state discrimination (USD) technique. These operations can be
applied as a basis for a security analysis of the original coherent one-way (COW) QKD protocol
since their application interpolates between beam-splitting (BS) and USD attacks. We demonstrate
that a zero-error attack based on quantum soft filtering operations gives a larger amount of the
information for Eve at a given level of losses. We calculate the Eve information as a function of the
channel length. The efficiency of the proposed attack highly depends on the level of the monitoring
under the maintenance of the statistics of control (decoy) states, and best-case results are achieved
in the case of the absence of maintenance of control state statistics. Our results form additional
requirements for the analysis of practical QKD systems based on the COW QKD protocol and its
variants by providing an upper bound on the security.
I. INTRODUCTION
QKD is a method that allows establishing uncondition-
ally secure communications between distinct legitimate
parties [1–4]. An important step in the practical imple-
mentation of QKD devices is a comprehensive analysis
both from the viewpoint of hardware attacks and subtle
questions of realizing QKD protocols [2]. A peculiarity of
the security analysis of QKD protocols is the fact that the
eavesdropper is limited by laws of physics only, whereas
all advanced technological and computational resources
are available for attacks. The significant progress on the
security analysis of QKD protocols against general at-
tacks has been performed [5–10]. Experimental and in-
dustrial realizations of QKD devices have also reached
key distribution of reasonable rates over distances of 100
km (for a review, see Ref. [4]).
The class of QKD protocols that is of specific interest
for the analysis is related to methods, which are used
in existing commercial QKD devices. Examples include,
in particular, the distributed-phase-reference (DPR) ap-
proach [11–19], specifically, differential-phase-shift [11–
15] and COW [16–19] QKD protocols. A general security
proof of DPR-QKD in a realistic setting has been missing,
and only particular cases have been considered [20–28].
This problem has been recently generally resolved, and
lower bounds for a special variant of the COW protocol
have been obtained [29]. Nevertheless, the search for se-
curity bounds for various implementations of COW-like
schemes still is an important research activity in the the-
ory of quantum key distribution. An important concept
in the security analysis of COW-like protocols is zero-
error attacks based on the USD technique [21]. In this
case, Eve can take advantage only of the losses, so the
attack combines three USD strategies and preserves all
the observed detection rates in Bob’s detectors.
In this work, we consider a general class of quantum
operations, so-called quantum soft filtering, which can be
used for obtaining security bounds for COW-like proto-
cols. We demonstrate that in the context of the COW
security analysis, quantum soft filtering operations inter-
polate between standard BS attack and USD technique.
If applied as a basis for an attack scenario in the COW
QKD protocol, quantum soft filtering operations give a
larger amount of the information for Eve at a given level
of losses. We calculate the Eve information as a function
of the channel length and show the efficiency of attacks
based on soft filtering operations highly depends on the
level of the control under the maintenance of statistics of
control (decoy) states. Our results are of interest for ob-
taining upper bounds on the security for practical QKD
systems based the COW QKD protocol and its variants.
Our work is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we briefly
review the COW QKD protocol and zero-error attacks.
In Sec. III, we discuss quantum soft filtering operations.
In Sec. IV, we obtain improved security bounds for the
COW protocol using an attack based on quantum soft
filtering operations. We discuss the correspondence be-
tween quantum soft filtering and BS-based and USD-
based attacks. In Sec. V. we discuss the obtained results
and compare them with BS and USD attacks. We discuss
main results and conclude in Sec. VI.
II. COW PROTOCOL AND ZERO-ERROR
ATTACKS
Here we remind the idea of the COW protocol [16–19].
The basic scenario is that Alice encodes bits using time
slots containing either vacuum |0〉 or signal |α〉 states,
where the mean number of photons µ = |α|2 < 1. The
logical bit corresponds to sequences |0〉|α〉 and |α〉|0〉. In
order to prevent attacks, Alice also sends control states of
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2the form |α〉|α〉 (they also called decoy states). Alice pro-
duces each bit value with probability (1− f)/2, whereas
with the probability f she sends the decoy sequence.
The prepared quantum states are then sent to Bob
through a quantum channel with length L and the cor-
responding transmittance t = 10−δL, where δ is the at-
tenuation coefficient. On the detection side, Bob regis-
ters the time-of-arrival of the photons on detectors DB
for providing the raw key and checks the statistics for
the detections on detectors DMi in the monitoring line
for destructive interference of decoy and information se-
quences [18]. After the formation of the raw key, Alice
and Bob implement a post-processing procedure and, in
particular, check the statistical parameters of the proto-
col. Specifically, the important stage is to check detection
rates.
That is why the most interesting class of attacks that
should be taken into account for obtaining the corre-
sponding bounds for COW-like QKD protocols is zero-
error attacks [21]. This class of attacks does not intro-
duce any errors in usually checked parameters of the pro-
tocol, such as quantum bit error rate (QBER) and the
visibility of an interferometer. The simplest example of
such an attack is the BS attack. In the BS attack, Eve
simulates the lossy channel by extracting the (1− t) frac-
tion of the signal with a beam-splitter, and then sends
expected fraction t to Bob on a lossless line. The main
advantage of this attack is the fact that beam-splitter is
equivalent to losses in the transmission channel, so the
attack is always possible and is impossible to detect by
monitoring the data of Alice and Bob. However, this at-
tack is not very powerful since the Eve information tends
to the Holevo information [30] of initial states rather than
to unity.
Another basis for zero-error attacks is to use USD tech-
nique. In this attack, Eve tries to extract the full in-
formation from transmitted quantum states and block
them once she fails. The USD-based attack has been in
details considered in Refs. [21, 24], where each of three
USD strategies is to distinguish sequences that begin and
end with the vacuum state, in particular sequences |0α0〉,
|0α : α0〉 and |0 : αα : 0〉, that allows leaving zero value
of QBER and the visibility equal to unity.
III. QUANTUM SOFT FILTERING
Here we consider quantum soft filtering operations,
which as we demonstrate generalize the USD-technique.
These operations correspond to probabilistic information
extraction. For a pair of non-orthogonal states |a0〉 and
|a1〉, quantum soft filtering operations in the Stinespring
representation (also known as the Stinespring dilation)
are as follows:
|a0〉 → √p|b0〉 ⊗ |s〉+
√
1− p|0〉 ⊗ |f〉,
|a1〉 → √p|b1〉 ⊗ |s〉+
√
1− p|0〉 ⊗ |f〉,
(1)
where 〈b0|b1〉 < 〈a0|a1〉 and 〈s|f〉 = 0. Eq. (1) has
the following physical meaning: One can whether make
the states {|a0〉, |a1〉} more distinguishable with success
probability p, that yields the “success” signal |s〉, or one
can fail with the probability 1 − p and get the failure
signal |f〉.
We note that auxiliary states |s〉 and |f〉 help to reveal
whether the soft filtering operation was successful, or the
states passed into vacuum. Due to the fact that |s〉 and
|f〉 are orthogonal, one can distinguish successful and
unsuccessful applications of the operations.
Unitarity of quantum soft filtering (1) gives the follow-
ing condition on the conservation of the scalar product
between the original and final states:
〈a0|a1〉 = p〈b0|b1〉 − (1− p). (2)
Thus, from the unitary condition, the success probability
is as follows:
p =
1− 〈a0|a1〉
1− 〈b0|b1〉 . (3)
There are two notable particular cases of soft filtering
operations. First is “doing nothing”, where ai and bi are
the same and the success probability is equal to unity.
Second is USD discrimination, where 〈b0|b1〉 = 0 and the
success probability is 1− 〈a0|a1〉.
We should note that the possibility to use filtering op-
erations and their generalizations has been considered in
various contexts, in particular for the analysis of other
QKD protocols, such as BB84 [31] and DPS [24, 32].
IV. SECURITY BOUNDS FOR COW USING
QUANTUM SOFT FILTERING
Here we demonstrate that quantum soft filtering is
helpful for obtaining security bounds for COW-like pro-
tocols in its original version. The attack based on quan-
tum soft filtering operations has a number of important
features. First, our attack is adaptive, i.e. the strat-
egy of the attack depends on the results of the previous
steps. Second, in this attack Eve does not waste its re-
sources, i.e. the possibility to block some states, on the
discrimination between vacuum and decoy states. This
allows focusing the attention on the discrimination be-
tween information states since the position of the states
will be announced later. Third, the attack is designed in
a zero-error manner. In the view of the fact that COW-
like protocols are widely used in experiments on QKD, it
represents an interesting scheme for illustrating the ap-
plication of quantum soft filtering.
A. Attack scenario
The attack scenario assumes that Eve works with the
tuples of the states, that begin and end with vacuum
3state |0〉 in analogy to the USD-based attack. Then some
of these tuples should be blocked by Eve, and the rest
reaches Bob with higher intensity so that the average de-
tection rate remains the same as expected by Bob and the
visibility remains constant. Eve should also preserve the
percentage of control states so that the legitimate users
could not detect the attack by the statistical changes.
The attack consists of several stages.
(i) On the first stage, Eve tries to find a vacuum state
by measuring each state while blocking the other signals
where vacuum states were not obtained. For an informa-
tion state, the probability of successful vacuum discrim-
ination (Z) is 1− e−µA .
(ii) On the second stage, Eve starts forming the tuple
for the found position of the vacuum state. Then she per-
forms a small number TSF1 of SF1 operations, which can
be defined by the following Stinespring representation:
|α〉|0〉 → √p1|β〉|0〉 ⊗ |ε1〉|0〉 ⊗ |s〉+√
1− p1|0〉|0〉 ⊗ |0〉|0〉 ⊗ |f〉,
|0〉|α〉 → √p1|0〉|β〉 ⊗ |0〉|ε1〉 ⊗ |s〉+√
1− p1|0〉|0〉 ⊗ |0〉|0〉 ⊗ |f〉,
|α〉|α〉 → √q1|β〉|β〉 ⊗ |E〉 ⊗ |s〉+√
1− q1|0〉|0〉 ⊗ |0〉|0〉 ⊗ |f〉,
(4)
where the states {|β〉|0〉, |0〉|β〉, |β〉|β〉} belong to
the Bob subspace, and the states {|s〉, |f〉} and
{|ε1〉|0〉, |0〉|ε1〉, |E〉} belong to the Eve subspace. Here
the state |E〉 belongs to the 2-dimensional subspace
spanned by the states |ε1〉|0〉 and |0〉|ε1〉, and if we denote
cos ε′1 = e
−|ε1|2 , then
〈E|ε1〉|0〉 = 〈E|0〉|ε1〉 = cos ε
′
1
2
, (5)
where |E〉 lies between |ε1〉|0〉 and |0〉|ε1〉.
In our attack strategy, Eve blocks the whole tuple in
case any of these SF1 operations fail.
The SF1 operation is useful for increasing the portion
of control states after the attack. If we denote µA = |α|2,
µB = |β|2 and µE1 = |ε1|2, then unitary conditions read
p1 =
1− e−µA
1− e−(µB+µE1) , (6)
e−
1
2µA =
√
p1q1e
− 12µB
√
1
2
(1 + e−µE1)+√
(1− p1)(1− q1).
(7)
From this expression it is possible to extract the suc-
cess probability q1 for the control states as follows:
q1 = cos
2
arccos
 √p
√
1+e−µE1
2 e
−µB2
pe−µB
(
1+e−µE1
2
)
+ 1− p
 −
− arccos
 e−µA
pe−µB
(
1+e−µE1
2
)
+ 1− p
 .
(8)
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Figure 1. Example of the attack scenario.
One can see that if µB is not too large, then q1 is higher
than p1. So in this case SF1 operation increases the por-
tion of control states. We note that for large values of
µE1 and not very large values of µB , SF1 operation im-
plements a sort of USD for the information states, but
without modifying control states that reach the Bob side
and without trying to discriminate between information
and control states. This information will be obtained
later.
(iii) On the third stage, Eve performs a number of SF2
operations, which are defined as follows:
|α〉|0〉→√p2|β〉|0〉⊗|ε2〉|0〉⊗|s〉+√
1−p2|0〉|0〉⊗|0〉|0〉⊗|f〉,
|0〉|α〉→ √p2|0〉|β〉⊗|0〉|ε2〉⊗|s〉+√
1−p2|0〉|0〉⊗|0〉|0〉⊗|f〉,
|α〉|α〉→ √q2|β〉|β〉⊗|ε2〉|ε2〉⊗|s〉+√
1−q2|0〉|0〉⊗|0〉|0〉⊗|f〉,
(9)
with similar notations µA = |α|2, µB = |β|2 and µE2 =
|ε2|2. The unitary conditions take a simple form
p2 =
1− e−µA
1− e−(µB+µE2) , q2 = p2e
µA−µB−µE2 . (10)
SF2 operation applies to the sequence from left to right
until the first failure or TSF2 successes in a row. Then
Eve performs the vacuum discrimination operation over
both Bob’s and Eve’s modes, from right to left starting
from the latest signal with successful SF2 operation. The
probability of successful vacuum discrimination for any
information state is 1−e−(µB+µE2). We note that SF2 de-
creases the percentage of control states, which is helpful
for the case when the following operation is the vacuum
states |0〉 discrimination.
After vacuum discrimination, the tuple is successfully
formed and the attack is completed.
(iv) If Eve fails to find the vacuum in any positions
with successful SF2 operation then attack is considered
to be failed for this tuple and all the pulses are blocked.
We note that the efficiency of the attack depends on
how strictly it is required to maintain the statistics of
control states in the pulses that reached Bob. If not
to follow the statistics, no SF1 operations are needed.
Then the attack becomes much more efficient, otherwise
the attack is less efficient, but still should be taken into
account at long distances.
4Let us consider Eve’s information in the case of suc-
cessful attack and calculate it after the announcement
of the positions of information states. If SF1 has been
applied successfully for information states then the Eve
information is given by the Holevo value of the states
|0〉|ε1〉 and |ε1〉|0〉 in her quantum memory, which is
equal to χ1=h2 [(1−e−µE1 ) /2]. The same holds for SF2
and the corresponding Eve information is as follows:
χ2=h2 [(1−e−µE2 ) /2].
For the vacuum discrimination at the beginning and
the end of the attack Eve obtains the full information or
nothing with the probability equal to 1/2 for both cases.
B. Example
Let us consider a simple example of the application of
the attack (see Fig. 1). Suppose that the sequence of
logical bits c01c10110 corresponds to
|α〉1|α〉1|α〉2|0〉2|0〉3|α〉3|α〉4|α〉4|0〉5|α〉5
|α〉6|0〉6|0〉7|α〉70〉8|α〉8|α〉9|0〉9. (11)
where subindex stands for the signal number.
In the considered case Eve is unable to find the vacuum
states in first two signals (1 and 2) and she succeeds in
the case of 3rd signal only. Then for signals 4 and 5 Eve
successfully realizes SF1 operation and SF2 for 6, 7, and
8. In the case of signal 9 Eve does not succeed in applying
SF 2. So the starts to find the vacuum state. This is
unsuccessful for signals 8, but works for 7. Therefore,
she can send a tuple of states with intensity µB between
signals 3 and 7 as follows:
|0〉1|0〉1|0〉2|0〉2|0〉3|β〉3|β〉4|β〉4|0〉5|β〉5
|β〉6|0〉6|0〉7|0〉7|0〉8|0〉8|0〉9|0〉9. (12)
Finally, Eve extracts one bit from signal 3, nothing from
signal 4 since this is the control state, the bound for
the Holevo information χ5 = h2 [1/2 (1− e−µE1 )] and
χ6 = h2 [1/2 (1− e−µE2 )] from signals 5 and 6, corre-
spondingly; and nothing form signal 7.
C. Analysis
Let us consider an expression for the successful prob-
ability of applying SF1 and SF2 operations. The total
probability is sum of success probabilities for signal and
control (decoy) states, which is as follows:
pSF1 = (1− f)p1 + fq1,
pSF2 = (1− f)p2 + fq2.
(13)
Then the fractions of the control states after success-
ful applying SF1 and SF2 operations have the following
form:
pd1 =
q1f
(1− f)p1 + fq1 ,
pd2 =
q2f
(1− f)p2 + fq2 .
(14)
For a given tuple we can calculate the success proba-
bility and the portion of control states after forming this
tuple as well as Eve’s information. Then we can obtain
an average value of the Eve’s information and the con-
trol states portion as the expectation values for any given
attack parameters, i.e.
• the number of SF1 operations TSF1;
• the maximum number of SF2 operations TSF2;
• Bob’s states intensity µB ;
• Eve’s state intensity after applying SF1 µE1 ;
• Eve’s state intensity after applying SF1 µE2 .
Also for a set of these parameters one can calculate the
average detector click probability on the Bob side that
gives the channel length between Alice and Bob, for
which this attack is possible. The Eve’s goal is to find
the set of parameters maximizing her information for the
given channel length with preserving the statistics of con-
trol states (if it is required).
We note that Eve can use probabilistic strategy, where
she employs various sets of parameters with correspond-
ing probabilities.
D. USD-like attack
For the considered attack the Eve information is not
equal to unity. If we additionally require this condition
then we can construct a sort of USD-like attack, where
Eve extracts full information or blocks the tuple. The
USD-like attack corresponds to the following set of pa-
rameters: µE1 = µE2 = +∞ and TSF2 = 1.
We note that the attack proposed in Ref. [21] has dif-
ficulties with the neighborhood of information and con-
trol states, which can be resolved by applying our at-
tack. Our USD-like attack does not block the sequence
|0〉|α〉 : |α〉|α〉, and for it this sequence does not differ from
the sequence |α〉|0〉 : |α〉|α〉. We also note that our USD-
like takes benefit of making the decision in the process of
attack and is not focused on any particular strategy.
V. RESULTS
We present results of the analysis of the suggested at-
tack in Fig. 2. Specifically, we present the key rate for our
proposed attack and BS attack at the detector efficiency
η = 0.1 and δ = 0.25 dB/km as a function of the length
5a) b)
Distance (km) Distance (km)
Figure 2. In (a) we present the key rate for proposed and beam-splitting attacks with parameters η = 0.1 and δ = 0.25 dB/km
as a function of the length of the channel between Alice and Bob. In (b) we show optimal mean photon number for three
attacks (the proposed attack, BS and USD-like attacks) with parameters η = 0.1 and δ = 0.25 dB/km as a function of the
length of the channel between Alice and Bob. The parameters are the same as in Ref. [21].
of the channel between Alice and Bob. As we show in
Fig. 2 (a) the suggested attack is better than BS attack
on the whole range of channel lengths. We note that this
is not the case for the original USD attack, which is bet-
ter than the BS attack starting from distances more that
100 km. In a sence the BS attack is close to a particu-
lar case of our attack for the following set of parameters:
TSF2 →∞, µB ≈ µA10−δL/10 and µE ≈ µA − µB .
In Fig. 2 (b) we present optimal intensities for our at-
tack and BS attack as well as the maximum intensity
starting from which Eve is able to extract full informa-
tion via USD-like attack scenario. One can see that the
suggested attack improves the results of Ref. [21]. As
in the case of the USD attack, there is no claim of op-
timality of the suggested attack based on quantum soft
filtering operations.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In conclusion, we have considered the applications of
quantum soft filtering operations for obtaining security
bounds for COW-like protocols. We have demonstrated
that in the context of the COW security analysis, quan-
tum soft filtering operations interpolate between stan-
dard BS attack and USD technique. We have also con-
sidered a special class of attacks based on quantum soft
filtering operations, where it is required for Eve infor-
mation to be unity. We have shown that the suggested
attack outperforms the BS attack on the whole range of
channel lengths and improves the attack based on the
USD strategy. We then expect that our results are of
interest for obtaining upper bounds on the security for
practical QKD systems based the COW QKD protocol
and its variants.
In particular, here we have considered the original ver-
sion of the COW protocol. However, there are its modi-
fications, which use other pairs of signals as information
states. We note that it is possible to use our approach to
form a tuple of pulses which starts and ends with vacuum
states (and can have vacuum states within) and therefore
maintains correct visibility, but for which Eve’s informa-
tion is high. However, the precise algorithm for various
modifications of the COW protocol is beyond the scope
of the present work.
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